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How syntax builds wholes from parts 
may be rather more like how a cubist 
painting builds a guitar from parts: 
in the absence of the whole, the parts 
make no sense. (Hinzen 2012: 335)
Throughout the history of generative gram-
mar, a primary theoretical goal has been to 
reduce the complexity of the human lan-
guage faculty to the bare minimum, keeping 
to traditional scientific guidelines of simplic-
ity and elegance. Certain aspects of language 
are plainly shared with other species, such as 
a great deal of speech perception. But since 
the emergence of the biolinguistic enterprise 
in the 1950s and 1960s (Lenneberg 1967), 
a major concern of linguists has been to 
uncover the biological basis of what syn-
tacticians deem to be unique to language. 
The current version of generative syntax, 
the Minimalist Program, proposes that the 
human capacity for language is genetically 
encoded in the computational system of 
the mind/brain (see Boeckx forthcoming 
for a discussion of the relationship between 
minimalism and biolinguistics). Minimalists 
typically assume that the operation ‘Merge’ 
is what permits humans to construct an 
unbounded number of hierarchically struc-
tured linguistic expressions (Chomsky 2015a, 
Hauser et al. 2014). Merge builds a new set-
theoretic syntactic object out of two items 
taken from the lexicon. Merge (the, chair) 
would form {the, chair}. I will assume the fol-
lowing standard definition:
(1) Merge:
Take two lexical items α and β and 
form the set {α, β}:
M(α, β) = {α, β}
I will additionally assume, following Boeckx 
(2014: 27), that the objects of narrow syntax 
are flat and atomic, or ‘lexical precursor cells’ 
(LPCs). That is, LPCs are not fully-fledged 
words, but are rather conceptual repre-
sentations the syntax assembles into ‘root’ 
concepts (Marantz 1997, Borer 2014), to be 
enriched by morphology. We can call the 
resulting lexicon the Precursor Lexicon, pLEX 
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Following on from recent work in minimalist syntax and ethology, I explore the 
implications of assuming that the operation Label is the defining feature of the 
human computational system. It is shown that labeling is responsible for a number 
of semantic and cognitive properties of the interpretative systems, a conclusion 
with direct repercussions for the study of the mind/brain. Finally, it is shown that 
the emergence of Label limits and directs human referentiality. 
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for short. There is also reason to believe that, 
when roots concatenate with other lexical 
atoms, they do so across the smallest search 
space possible, leading Larson (2015: 60) to 
propose the following restriction:
(2) General Restriction on Merge:
Merge can only apply to an object in a 
given search space if there is no pos-
sible Merge with an object in a more 
constrained search space.
Merge thus appears to be optimally designed, 
the centre of a ‘perfect’ computational sys-
tem (Chomsky 2015a: ix), suggesting, among 
other things, that it emerged suddenly 
through a genetic mutation and was shaped 
by natural law, and not through gradualist 
natural selection (Hauser et al. 2014). Most 
minimalists additionally hold that when two 
lexical items are merged, the constructed set 
is given a syntactic status independent of its 
parts, which relies on the featural specifi-
cation of one of the items. Departing from 
this, I will partially adopt Boeckx’s (2014) 
model, which assumes that interpretation 
requires a symmetry-breaking process, but 
I will claim that this is achieved by labeling, 
not cyclic Spell-Out. The set {α,β}, then, 
would be ‘labeled’ either an ‘Alpha Phrase’ 
or a ‘Beta Phrase’; or, if a verb Merged with 
a noun, it would constitute a Verb Phrase 
(VP), as in Jason ran. The label indicates the 
structure’s meaning to the conceptual-inten-
tional (CI) system (an axiom assumed by 
Chomsky 2013b, 2015b), roughly speaking 
the ‘thought system.’
The Decompositionalist Project: 
From passives to projections
I recently argued in Murphy (in prep) that 
the ‘unbundling’ (Collins 2014: 1) of the 
language faculty’s core operations – from 
complex operations like ‘passivise’ to sim-
ple generic operations like ‘word movement’ 
– can be taken one step further, decompos-
ing Merge into Concatenate (unordered 
set-formation) and Label. We could call this 
the Decompositionalist Project, in line with 
Poeppel’s (2012) goal of investigating the 
human ‘cognome’, or the set of computations 
performed by the human nervous system. 
Hornstein and Pietroski (2009: 113) simi-
larly noted that the operation combine(a,b) 
(or Merge) is not primitive, and consists of 
label[concatenate(a,b)], with labeling being 
‘perhaps distinctively human.’ Collins is mis-
taken, then, in claiming that his formula 
‘Merge(X,Y) = {X,Y}’ is ‘the simplest possible 
formulation of Merge’ (2014: 2). A small 
number of others linguists have pointed to 
the possibility of decomposing Merge, but 
few have attempted to derive any architec-
tural consequences from this. 
Along with labeling effects, another can-
didate for human-uniqueness is the hotly 
debated referential capacities of language 
and cognition. Terrace, reviewing decades 
of ape communication studies, claims that 
there is ‘No evidence that apes used any of 
the symbols they learned to refer to objects 
or events, or that those symbols had any 
function other than to request food or 
drink’ (2005: 101, see also Chomsky 2013a). 
What ethologists define as ‘the eagle call’ 
(that is, a monkey call announcing the pres-
ence of an eagle) may not, in fact, refer to 
eagles: ‘ACS units aren’t designed to refer, 
they’re designed to get other animals to 
do things’ (Bickerton 2009: 12). Moreover, 
under a phase-based syntax (Abels 2012), 
as lexical material moves to the edge of the 
phase away from the interior, [E [I ]] (e.g. 
[[The man] I met in London is not the one 
you know]) a special kind of ‘referentiality’ 
emerges (Hinzen & Sheehan 2013, Murphy 
2014), which is a phasal, and not a lexical/
featural, phenomenon. This form of refer-
ence uses syntactic structures to access 
intensional dimensions of meaning (Hinzen 
& Sheehan 2013: 37–47). This leads Martin 
and Hinzen (2014: 102) to propose the fol-
lowing hypothesis:
(3) The Grammar-Reference Link 
Hypothesis:
Referential strength (from predicativ-
ity to deixis) is not an intrinsic prop-
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erty of lexical items, but rather of cer-
tain grammatical configurations.
Under phase theory, syntactic derivations 
proceed via ‘chunks’ of material being sent 
to the CI and sensorimotor (SM) systems, 
instead of the sentence being sent as an 
entire unit, for reasons of computational effi-
ciency. The minimalist grammar is assumed 
to be composed of the CI and SM systems, 
narrow syntax (Merge), and, as of Chomsky 
(2013b), a labeling algorithm.1 The phases 
are typically assumed to be CP and v*P, and 
often DP in addition. Phase theory (Chomsky 
2001) together with the H-α schema elimi-
nates endocentric projection, XP-movement, 
pied-piping, and other aspects of the syntax 
(Narita 2012) – though not, crucially, labe-
ling. Note that the existence of labeling is 
not tethered to phases (neurobiological evi-
dence for this view can be found in Ramirez 
et al. 2015), but under a phasal approach to 
the grammar labels are given a central role 
in interpreting transferred, and subsequently 
‘referenced,’ structures. 
Despite Boeckx and Grohmann’s (2007: 
205) caveat that phases typically ‘recode 
insights from the past’ rather than enhance 
understanding, phasal referentiality has been 
well motivated in recent work by Hinzen and 
Sheehan (2013, see also Reichard 2013). Edge-
heavy Determiner Phrases (DPs) are strongly 
referential, correlating with edge-heavy v*Ps: 
when v fails to project fully sub-events arise, 
as in ‘Jason’s having been left’ (see De Villiers 
2014 for another phasal account of human 
event structure, and Ramchand & Svenonius 
2014 for related discussion).2 Contrary to 
compositionality (Pietroski 2005), only when 
a given phase is complete do we know how 
a root is used to refer. Hence operations of 
semantic composition (Boolean conjunc-
tion, etc.) become unmotivated; all that is 
needed is the label-driven phase. If the word 
book ‘refers to a particular book … this is a 
consequence, not of the lexical feature speci-
fications of “book,” but the phrasal syntactic 
configuration in which is it used’ (Hinzen 
2012: 313).3 Only human infants appear to 
be capable of declarative pointing (which 
acknowledges the viewpoints of conspecifics 
as sharing knowledge of external objects), 
and not just imperative pointing (requests, 
demands), which is perhaps the ‘first mani-
festation’ of a grammatical mind (Hinzen & 
Sheehan 2013: 246). DPs can ‘only denote 
an object in space, on a scale from maximal 
indefiniteness (generics, indefinite existen-
tial, etc.) to maximal definiteness (definite 
specific DPs)’ (Hinzen 2012: 325). But whilst 
‘The ontology and the grammar of reference 
… co-vary’ (Hinzen 2013: 11), ‘mediation does 
not imply possible reduction,’ as Boeckx 
(2014: 108) cautions. Further research is 
needed before what we might call a phasal 
semantics can truly emerge. But assuming 
that the ontology of reference and truth 
arises via phase, it becomes needless to base 
these notions in a Strong Minimalist Thesis-
type post-grammar CI system. Hence the fact 
that humans share aspects of their CI system 
with other great apes should be considered 
only alongside a framework of phasal analy-
sis when exploring referentiality and truth: 
lacking Label and pLEX, these notions cannot 
even be formulated. As Bolhuis and Wynne 
(2009: 833) put it, ‘As long as researchers 
focus on identifying human-like behaviour 
in other animals, the job of classifying the 
cognition of different species will be forever 
tied up in thickets of arbitrary nomenclature 
that will not advance our understanding of 
the mechanisms of cognition.’
Like Hinzen and Sheehan’s (2013) model, 
other phase-based theories of semantics 
have been proposed. Returning briefly to 
Neo-Davidsonianism, its representational 
devices yield what Boeckx (2014: 103) con-
vincingly identifies as ‘a near-perfect match’ 
between phasal derivations and Neo-
Davidsonian event representations, arguing 
for a causal relationship between the evolu-
tion of phases and complex event concepts 
(an observation also made by Hinzen 2008: 
354). For instance, C corresponds to the 
point of existential closure, v to thematic 
role assignment, and n to the type-lifting 
that turns a predicate into an argument 
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(see Murphy 2015a). Points of transfer in 
syntax also correspond to points of seman-
tic closure. It follows that the emergence 
of Label, in the context of phasal memory 
and transfer, yielded Neo-Davidsonian rep-
resentations, which in turn ‘allowed for 
the same event to be represented from dif-
ferent perspectives’ (Boeckx 2014: 106). 
Collins, amongst others, is consequently 
misguided in claiming that ‘syntax fails to 
match up with content in a principled way’ 
(2007: 806). Labeling is ‘the vehicle for mak-
ing human semantics out of some ancient 
operation associated with concatenation’ 
(Hornstein & Pietroski 2009: 125).
What I have called the Russellian phase 
(CP) can generate structures of propositional 
knowledge in the clausal domain in concert 
with the evaluation of tensed events by the 
Davidsonian phase (v*P) and the referenti-
ality of the Fregean phase (DP), structures 
found only in human language (Murphy 
2014). These Determiner, Aspect/Voice and 
Complementizer phase heads can label 
nominal, verbal, and other structures: [D/v/
C[N/V/T]]. With only full CPs yielding truth 
judgements, which in turn contain ‘events’ 
and ‘objects’ lower in the phasal topology, 
Hinzen and Sheehan convincingly conclude 
that ‘With the notion of truth, a notion of 
“world” arrives’ (2013: 84).4 It may well fol-
low from this that while some animals have 
memories (Emery & Clayton 2001), none of 
them have a past, a way of evaluating situa-
tions with respect to other propositionally-
constructed ‘worlds’ (Lewis 1979, Hinzen 
& Sheehan 2013: 62–3). I would also like 
to propose that the emergence of episodic 
memory (see Baddeley 2013 and Baddeley et 
al. 2014 for an overview), which is ‘recently 
evolved, late developing, past-oriented’ and 
‘probably unique to humans’ (Tulving 1999: 
278, though see Dere et al. 2006 for a con-
trary perspective), may be due to the inter-
face of this phasal computational system 
with primate memory systems.
Discussing the functional hierarchy, 
Ramchand and Svenonius claim that the 
order of functional projections/labels comes 
from ‘extralinguistic cognition,’ a ‘cognitive 
proclivity to perceive experience in terms of 
events, situations, and propositions,’ rather 
than the grammar itself:
[W]e have suggested that an EVENT is 
recognized as a special kind of object, 
with thematic participants, and that 
an event combined with a certain spe-
cial kind of parameter … for example 
a time, is a SITUATION, a conceptu-
ally different ‘sort’ of object from an 
event. A situation includes an event 
as a privileged part, somewhat like 
the way a person includes a body. 
Similarly, a situation merged with 
another special kind of parameter … 
is a PROPOSITION, which is again a 
different sort from, and constitutively 
includes, the situation. (Ramchand & 
Svenonius 2014: 172)
This ‘extralinguistic’ account has certain 
advantages over the phasal theory of ref-
erence (it does not downplay the carto-
graphic literature (Cinque 1999, 2014), for 
instance). But while Boeckx (2015: 167) cor-
rectly notes that ‘claiming that properties of 
thought [reduce] to properties of grammar 
is explanatory only insofar as the properties 
of grammar are well understood,’ and while 
truth does in fact appear to be the output 
of an interaction effect, and not a purely 
grammatical phenomena (‘Since when does 
grammar indicate when sentences are true 
or false?’ (Boeckx 2015: 177); ‘Constructing 
sentences that can be true or false requires 
cognitive work, not just an exercise of our 
natural capacity to generate SEMs’ (Pietroski 
2010: 273)), this does not exclude the pos-
sibility that it emerged from grammar, per-
haps in a similar way that grammar yielded, 
say, the principles of Relevance Theory 
(Sperber & Wilson 1995), which appear 
specific to language but are certainly not 
purely phasal phenomena. Elsewhere in 
their study, Hinzen and Sheehan (2013) deny 
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the existence of structures like object and 
event in non-human primates. Yet phases 
are of no explanatory force when it comes 
to objecthood, though certain concepts are 
no doubt lexicalised in such a way as to 
permit a phasal system to recombine them 
with other concepts. Relatedly, in contrast to 
Bruening’s (2014) phase-command model, I 
have made the case against placing phases 
at the centre of an account of binding rela-
tions (Murphy 2015c). Epstein et al. (2014) 
even propose that, by extending Chomsky’s 
(2013b, 2015b) minimal search labeling algo-
rithm to successive-cyclic A-movement, the 
postulate phase is rendered unnecessary in 
analysing cases of illicit A-movement, which 
can instead be reduced to labeling failures. 
Further research is needed, however, before 
the status of phases within the architecture 
of the grammar can be seriously brought 
into question. Nevertheless, let’s assume that 
certain movement phenomena are indeed 
the result of initial labeling failures, with a 
moved element giving the resulting phrases 
(say, XP and YP) shared prominent features 
(φ-features or Q-features, for instance). If this 
is the case, it lends credence to a Boeckxian 
anti-lexicalist biolinguistics, and suggests 
that the ‘relabeling’ theory of Cecchetto and 
Donati (2015) is unmotivated. Their lexical-
ist account claims that words have a relabe-
ling capacity, with a moved word sometimes 
assigning a structure a new label. This analy-
sis is brought into question when we con-
sider, with Adger (2013), that the root clauses 
upon which Cecchetto and Donati focus 
most of their attention are always labeled 
pre-movement, a labeled object only receives 
a single interpretation, and that the labeling 
algorithm doesn’t apply to anything as mor-
phologically internally complex as words, but 
roots. But Cecchetto and Donati (2015: 31) 
are correct to note that ‘labels belong to the 
core part of grammar that … cannot be rel-
egated to the interface’, and their Simplified 
Phase Impenetrability Condition (SPIC) also 
builds a stronger connection between phases 
and labels:
(4) Simplified Phase Impenetrability 
Condition
When a phase is concluded, only its 
label remains accessible to further 
syntactic computation.
SPIC can be motivated independently of 
Cecchetto and Donati’s relabeling approach, 
such as through Boeckx’s (2014) transitive-
intransitive phase model, under which the 
only constituents remaining in the deri-
vation post-transfer would be labels. Yet 
Cecchetto and Donati (2015: 157) also pro-
pose that ‘referentiality is a feature’, stipulat-
ing that this sophisticated cognitive capacity 
can be accounted for through featural stipu-
lations. The next section will question this 
assumption by attempting to ground certain 
aspects of referentiality in other compo-
nents of the grammar. 
Phasal and Representational 
Individuation
A further potential problem for Hinzen and 
Sheehan is posed by Boeckx (2015: 181): ‘[W]
hy, if grammar is so discontinuous from the 
rest of primate cognition, does it resort to 
classes like object, event, etc., as opposed 
to other conceivable notions (smells, colors, 
etc.)?’ But if grammar (Concatenate/Simplest 
Merge plus Label under the assumptions of 
the Decompositionalist Project) interfaced 
with CI then it would have to interface with it 
in some way, and perhaps objects and events 
are more salient/prominent in primate CI 
systems than other classes – or at least suf-
ficiently salient/prominent or generic – to 
permit the kind of universal phasal map-
ping discussed by Hinzen and Sheehan. Still, 
despite the phasal constraints imposed on 
reference, the act of reference itself may 
constitute what Boeckx (2015: 182) calls 
‘the application of an ancient mechanism 
applied to novel mental units detached 
from their perceptual inputs,’ that is, lexi-
cal items. Summarising related findings, 
Zuberbühler (2006: 124) notes that, due to 
a lack of understanding about the mental 
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states of conspecifics, ‘non-human primates 
referential signalling thus takes place in a 
remarkable state of mind-blindness’ (see, for 
instance, Cheney & Seyfarth 1990).
Lacking phase-based hierarchical struc-
ture-building and LPCs, non-humans are 
incapable of freely combining conceptual 
units. They are capable only of generating 
‘functionally referential signals’ (Macedonia 
& Evans 1993, Townsend & Manser 2013). 
Petitto writes that a chimpanzee uses the 
sign for apple to refer to ‘the action of eating 
apples, the location where the apples are 
kept, events and locations of objects other 
than apples that happened to be stored with 
an apple … all simultaneously and without 
apparent recognition of the relevant differ-
ences or the advantages of being able to dis-
tinguish among them’ (2005: 86, emphasis 
mine).5 Despite the relative inflexibility of 
their referential capacities, predator-spe-
cific alarm calls are very common amongst 
Diana monkeys, vervet monkeys, lemurs, 
and capuchins (Lemasson et al. 2013: 188, 
Macedonia 1990). Nim Chimsky produced 
signs that were far less diverse in combina-
toriality than those of two-year old children 
(Yang 2013). Yet, when we attend to the ‘all 
simultaneously’ part of Petitto’s discussion, 
and compare it to complex semantic phe-
nomena like copredication in (5), in which 
we can attend to different aspects of the 
meaning of a word simultaneously (i.e. its 
abstract and concrete features), perhaps the 
gulf between human and primate reference 
is not so wide after all (see Murphy forth-
coming for discussion).6 Maybe it is only the 
mode of reference, a phasal grammar, which 
is unique to humans: 
(5) a.  The newspaper I held this morn-
ing has gone bust.
 b.  Liverpool burned down and was 
rebuilt a few miles up the river.
Further to this, empirical, topographic 
approaches to concept clustering (Troche 
et al. 2014, Pollock 2014) provide reason 
to believe that the conceptual basis for 
abstract words like justice and morality 
extends beyond the lexicon.7 Gärdenfors and 
Osvath (2005) have also argued that non-
humans do not actually ‘plan’ at all (contra 
Emery & Clayton 2004). Squirrels who store 
food for winter are concerned only with 
the present, having no conception of win-
ter, whilst a chimp who remembers where 
food is stored is most likely reminded of its 
location through a somatosensory stimulus 
from hunger. Similar results lead Gruber et 
al. (2015: 1) to conclude that ‘Apes have cul-
ture but may not know that they do’, finding 
‘no evidence for metarepresentations of cul-
tural knowledge.’ They propose the ‘Jourdain 
Hypothesis’ under which apes engage in 
cultural interactions without being aware of 
the cultural nature of their existence, put-
ting this down to cognitive limitations on 
their knowledge representation faculties. 
Townsend and Manser (2013: 8), review-
ing the literature on animal reference, also 
conclude that there currently exists no 
operational ‘definitions of external “objects” 
or “events”’ which animals are supposed to 
refer to. I think that given the flexibility in 
perspective granted by the labeling of lexical 
categories onto ‘roots’, it is reasonable to pro-
pose that the combinatorics seen in the type 
of grammar attributed to certain aspects of 
language, mildly context-sensitive grammar 
(Joshi 1985, Fitch & Friederici 2012), permits 
a level of detachment from external stimuli, 
of stepping back from the world, rather than 
relating us to it.
Correspondingly, the biolinguistic claim 
(Hinzen 2006) that mapping to SM is ancil-
lary to semantic interpretation is supported 
by cross-species studies (Hauser 2008). Male 
zebra finches sing when alone, an act that 
cannot conceivably have any sexually seduc-
tive or communicative properties (Sossinka & 
Böhner 1980). Even the category of ‘animal 
communication’ is a ‘biologically illusory 
one’: ‘[T]he range of application of the [term] 
is so wide and heterogeneous … that one can-
not expect any reliable extrapolations from 
putative token instances of the category to 
extend to the category as a whole’ (Balari & 
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Lorenzo 2013: 4, 56, see also Scott-Phillips 
2010). It is not at all clear, then, that much 
sense can be made of Savage-Rumbaugh et 
al.’s (1998) proposal that ‘primate communi-
cation’ is an intermediate stage between ani-
mal communication and human language 
(see Murphy in preparation for further etho-
logical review). 
In concert with the pragmatic faculties, 
which perform enrichment operations like 
saturation (Stanley and Szabó 2000), linguis-
tic processing appears to fit a model I have 
called Phasal Eliminativism (Murphy 2015b):
(6) Phasal Eliminativism:
Lexical items supply instructions to 
the CI-system to build pragmatically 
saturated concepts in a cyclic fashion.
This model supports the notion that words 
are not concepts but rather instructions to 
build concepts (from their semantic features) 
(Pietroski forthcoming, see also Hinzen forth-
coming). Pragmatic processes enrich syntactic 
structures, which are radically underspecified 
for conceptual content. LPCs acquire their 
lexical features as the derivation proceeds 
and phases are transferred to the interfaces 
(Munakata 2009). Lexical categories arise 
post-derivationally due to the impact of gen-
eral cognitive effects upon the syntax-inter-
face convergence (Adger p.c.). What lexical 
features contribute is a unique configuring of 
other mental systems, providing instructions 
to them (Chomsky 2012: 191).
Taking us slightly further afield, what rea-
sons do we have for assuming that labeling 
is a language-specific operation? Arsenijević 
(2008: 5), through exploring similarities 
between language and the cognitive maps 
of spatial cognition, argues that when two 
places have the same non-geometric fea-
tural description their position relative to 
another place may act as the distinctive 
feature. This suggests that spatial computa-
tions use hierarchical structures of the kind 
‘[THE_SHELTER [BETWEEN [THE_TREE AND 
THE_ROCK [ALONG [THE_WATER [BEHIND 
[THE_HILL]]]]]]]’. This capacity requires 
an External Merge (Concatenate) opera-
tion, but crucially not an Internal Merge 
(Concatenate/Copy and Label) operation, 
which implies labeling. Another salient lan-
guage-vision connection could emerge from 
the possibility that ‘a robust quantitative 
constraint on the number of arguments that 
a predicate can take [may be] attributed to 
a deep-rooted constraint on the number of 
separate objects the visual system can track’ 
(Hurford 2011: 56). Music and mathematics 
require some form of concatenation opera-
tion, but headedness appears to be absent: 
The sum ‘7 + 12’ does not produce a ‘7-like’ 
or ‘12-like’ construct, but an independent 
numerical structure, 19.
A Label-only perspective on the evolution 
of grammar has other rich and interesting 
consequences. For instance, the relational-
ity of nouns such as edge and hand now 
emerges not from the semantics of these lex-
ical items but rather from the syntax itself. 
Adger (2013) argues that their semantics is 
introduced by a light root, with a new cat-
egory labeling the structure composed from 
the Self Merge (that is, yielding [[x]] from [x]) 
of this light root, denoted by ק: [ק [N side]
[ק [PP of the table][ק √PART]. ק Merges with 
the Prepositional Phrase, which is the appro-
priate semantic type to Merge with N, yield-
ing at CI: λx.side(x) ∧ part(x,the-table). What 
Coetzee (2013: 122) calls ‘chairs and their 
chairness’ arises not through visual percep-
tion (which contributes, at most, sortal and 
colour features (see Carey 2009: 273 for an 
overview of these visual computations)) but 
rather from this labeling operation, which 
projects root concepts into a ‘universal cur-
rency’ (Boeckx 2010: 128) where they can re-
combine in novel ways. 
If these perspectives are even approxi-
mately accurate, it follows that we should 
discard our favourite philosophy of language 
textbooks, which sever content from form 
(and universally sideline the latter), and 
instead approach the Decompositionalist 
Project by establishing a division between 
(semantic) content that relies on the forms 
of grammar and content that does not. As 
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mentioned, Epstein et al. (2014) demon-
strate that syntactic derivations are driven 
by the need to label structures, providing 
interpretive instructions to the CI system. It 
remains to be seen what other syntactic and 
semantic phenomena labeling is responsible 
for, but for now we can conclude that Label 
plays a substantial – perhaps unique – role in 
human cognition. 
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Notes
 1 The architectural and evolutionary 
implications of separating labeling from 
Merge have oddly not been discussed by 
Chomsky and other linguists assuming 
his model (e.g. Larson 2015).
 2 I assume DP/KP ([K[D,NP]]) is a phase 
(Svenonius 2004, Caha 2009, Bošković 
2012), which forms part of a basic phase-
non-phase rhythm to syntactic computa-
tion: [C-T[v-V[K-N]]] (Uriagereka 2012).
 3 If we also acknowledge the problem 
of copredication (Gotham 2012, 2015, 
Murphy 2012, forthcoming), perhaps it 
becomes more accurate to say that a book 
can be ‘realised as’ – or have as its ‘host’ 
– a physical medium, more than it would 
be to say that a given physical object is 
itself a book.
 4 Similarly, Hinzen et al. (2011: 278) note 
of consciousness that ‘It is not clear 
whether any such form of self-reference 
can be sustained in the absence of a sys-
tem of grammatical person’. Note that 
philosophers of language (e.g. Ray 2014) 
universally ignore the importance of 
syntax in the construction of truth and 
reference.
 5 Informally speaking, it has been well 
established by ethologists that animals 
do not have names for things, but what 
is not recognised by most is that neither 
do humans: ‘Internalist’ studies in phi-
losophy of language convincingly show 
that lexical items are highly intricate and 
conceptually independent of the enti-
ties posited by physical theory (Chomsky 
2000, 2013a, Hinzen 2006, 2007). Con-
trary to externalists like Putnam (1975) 
and Burge (1979), water does not ‘equal’ 
H2O partly because ‘Entities in a domain 
of the mind do not symbolize other ele-
ments in that domain: they are the ele-
ments’ (Bouchard 2013: 44). Indeed, ‘the 
belief in the existence of definitions is 
really utopian’ (Hornstein 1984: 132).
 6 My thanks to Cedric Boeckx for helpful 
discussion on this point.
 7 See Varley & Siegal (2000) and Bloom 
(2000) for a particular lesion case provid-
ing support for the division of linguistic 
and conceptual meaning.
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